To what extent can the late-nineteenth-century imperial wars be considered ‘modern wars’?
By Elaura Lacey, Third Year History Student
To evaluate the modern qualities of the late 19th century imperial wars, we must first question the concept of ‘modernity’. The notion of ‘modernity’ is multifaceted and can therefore be measured through a wide set of historical lenses. One way we can measure the extent to which these imperial wars were modern, is by the changes in military approaches, strategies and attitudes to warfare compared to the Napoleonic era. The emergence of open formations, intensified violence through weapon innovation, and professional military procedures in the incarceration of civilians were key innovations unique to the imperial wars in South Africa, Cuba, and the Philippines. These developments were products of increased nationalism within the colonies and imperial response to the increasing climate of guerrilla warfare. Using the case examples of the Boer War (1899-1902), the Cuban Rebellion (1895-1898) and colonial resistance in the Philippines (1899-1902), the imperial wars at the end of the nineteenth century can be considered modern through their engagement with military professionalism, technological innovation and nationalism.
Considering such a definition of modernity in relation to warfare, the development of military professionalism can be identified as a key feature that underpinned the new military culture of the 1890s. A reformist movement in early 19th century Prussia transformed military structure by introducing General Staff in 1803. This coordination led to the establishment of military institutions which trained soldiers in military science, producing men who valued extreme logic, efficiency, and organisation in warfare in comparison to a hierarchy based on nepotism, social status, and civility.
Jonathan Hyslop identifies this professionalism as a key development which led to the birth of the concentration camp; a modern phenomenon which embodied the logic and lack of moral concern in this new military culture. The concentration camp serves as a lens by which we can assess the changes brought about by this culture, particularly through leadership and policies directed at civilians. In the Cuban rebellion of 1894, concentration camps were introduced in Spanish policy to macro-manage the civilian population after rebels were deterring people from fleeing to Spanish-controlled zones. This was taken further with the 1896 policy that aimed to destroy food resources and starve the guerrilla fighters. The systematic formats by which the military were killing and incarcerating colonial civilians at mass was a concept unknown in warfare up to this point. In a letter addressed to the Spanish Prime Minister, Commanding General Martinez Campos wrote, ‘I cannot, as the representative of a civilised nation, be the first to give the example of cruelty and intransigence’, demonstrating how the previously stated gentlemanly nature of military warfare had been replaced by a new emphasis on systematic killing.
In a paradox of assessment, Daniel Whittingham described the Scorched Earth policy implemented by the Spanish during the Cuban Rebellion, and by Field Marshal H.H Kitchener in the Boer War of 1899-1902, as depicting a “military dark age”. He identifies this new brute force as mimicking primeval military tactics, suggesting the moral devolution that correlated with technological and theoretical advancements. The shifts in attitudes displayed by the military leaders of the time evidence the impact the new military culture had on warfare, and how increased violence was a product of military discipline and professionalism.
Another key development in the modernisation of warfare at the end of the 19th century was firearm innovation. The transformation of firearms had drastic impacts on battlefield dynamics as well as soldier’s psychological responses to violence. During the Napoleonic period, battlefield dynamics were tailored to the firing abilities of the commonly used smoothbore musket which had a firing range of only 150-metres and a fire rate of three to four rounds a minute. The poor accuracy of this weapon determined approaches to battle, resulting in soldiers having to shoot simultaneously in close-knit infantries for effective results. The introduction of the Remington rifle, the breech-loader and the 1890 bolt-action rifle forced the dispersion of formations due to increased exposure, changing battle strategy permanently.
This was evidenced by the first time the British infantry used the Remington rifle at the Battle of La Verde during the Mitrista revolution in 1874. In just under three hours of fighting, there were estimated to have been 300-400 casualties on the rebel side, thus swiftly ending the confrontation. The heavy casualties inflicted were a result of a weapons gap between the imperial military and the rebels, as well as the formations adopted by the counter-insurgency which failed to defend the rebels. As these weapons became more available to rebel movements, imperial armies were forced to resort to open formations.
The psychological response soldiers were having to more efficient use of deadly weapons was commented on in the Sunday Review in 1898 by a British citizen. The unidentified author comments on the weapons gap at the Battle of Omdurman during the Boer War, suggesting that the British have rejected fair-play on the battlefield in favour of ‘infernal machines which modern science has placed at the disposal of a modern army’. Although warfare was more accurate and professional in administration, soldiers appeared to have devolved into brutal killers, which contradicted the metropole’s image of being a civilised nation. We can see a contradiction in the way in which firearm innovation impacted warfare here. In respect to the basic purpose of war, the improvements made to weapons had strengthened the military’s ability to efficiently win a battle through causing heavy casualties, therefore modernising it in the sense of perfecting warfare tactics. However, this had a devolving effect on the moral consciousness of soldiers, which raised domestic concern.
In summary, from the comparative evaluation of how the imperial wars of the late nineteenth century differed from Napoleonic military strategy, we can determine a presidential modernisation in warfare. Developments in social and technological fields, with the rise of nationalism and advanced military weaponry, had drastic impacts on the way in which imperial soldiers operated in war and the military culture they belonged to. Although these developments generated more efficient methods in battle, they had a devolving effect on soldier morality and regimented military structure. Therefore, the late nineteenth century imperial wars can be considered ‘modern’ in the eyes of contemporaries, however by present-day standards these wars existed in the prototype phase of twenty-first century warfare.
Bibliography
I. Hull, Absolute Destruction: Military Culture and the Practises of War in Imperial Germany (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 2019) pp. 98-100
J. Hyslop, ‘The Invention of the Concentration Camp: Cuba, Southern Africa and the Phillippines, 1896-1907’, South African Historical Journal, pp. 251-276
J. Tone, War and Genocide in Cuba, 1895-1898 (University of North Carolina Press, 2006) p. 121, found in J. Hyslop, The Invention of the Concentration Camp.
D. Whittingham, ‘Savage Warfare’: C.E. Calwell, the roots of counter-insurgency, and the nineteenth century context, Small Wars & Insurgencies (2012) p. 592
G. Phillips, Military Morality Transformed: Weapons and Soldiers on the Nineteenth-Century Battlefield, Journal of Interdisciplinary History (2011) p. 566
M. Pichipil, ‘Remington Rifle Brass Cartridges: Witnesses of an Age’, Procedia Materials Science (2012) p. 660
‘The Battle of Omdurman’, The Saturday Review, 17 September 1898
Cover Image Credit: Stijn Swinnen on Unsplash