There is nothing of the “social bandit” about Golden Age pirates. Do you agree?
By Harriet Coombs, Third Year History Student
Marcus Rediker defines the Golden Age of Piracy as being the period from 1716 to 1726.[1] Modern conceptions of piracy in popular culture and traditional historiography have depicted pirates within this period as a ‘disorganized rabble’,[2] however Rediker has since challenged this view, claiming pirate ships were socialist utopias governed by egalitarian and democratic principles.[3] In order to evaluate how far Golden Age pirates can be considered ‘social bandits’ it is necessary to refer to a definition of social banditry itself. The term coined by Marxist historian Eric Hobsbawm states that social banditry is an ‘endemic peasant protest against oppression and poverty. A desire for vengeance on the wealthy and oppressors and a want for justice rather than perfection in the world’.[4] Hobsbawm characterises social banditry as a form of class resistance within the peripheries of society. This essay will discuss pirates, not peasants, but will demonstrate how these principles are applicable to Golden Age pirates. Certainly, there is much evidence to suggest pirates do comply with this definition of social banditry. Motivations aside, pirates, many of whom had been sailors aboard merchant ships, did abandon traditional authority simply by joining a pirate band. Unlike merchant ships, which were organised hierarchically with captains having autocratic authority, pirates, as described by historian Peter Leeson, built an institutional framework with their own constitutions; pirate Articles of Agreement.[5] This democratic system of ‘piratical checks and balances’ prevented captain predation,[6]supporting Rediker’s view of pirates as early modern democratic socialists.[7] Using these examples, I have introduced the Golden Age pirates as democratically organised outlaws partaking in a form of class struggle. It is this depiction of pirates that has prevailed in popular culture, one quote from Johnson’s ‘A General History of the Pyrates’ stating, ‘They… made life of their old Freedom’.[8] This accurately reflects the widespread conceptions about the motivations of pirates: freedom and liberty. Despite this dominant narrative, there is much evidence to suggest pirates were not primarily concerned with a pursuit of freedom and self-governance. Certainly, the appeal of wealth, loot and booty coupled with the indiscriminate acts of violence give gravity to the argument that the Golden Age pirates’ principal motivations were economic. Through analysing the anti-capitalist attitudes of pirates, their pirate codes and some of the most prominent figures of the period, this essay will refute the claim that ‘there is nothing of the “social bandit” about Golden Age pirates’ whilst retaining that this definition has limited application due to their primarily economic motivations.
The fundamental principle to Hobsbawm’s definition of social banditry is the concept of class resistance. Given the significance that Hobsbawm attributes to this, it is necessary to evaluate how far Golden Age piracy was anti-capitalist- a form of class struggle . Anton Blok argues that social banditry results from capitalist expansion into pre-industrial societies.[9] It is in this way, Dawdy and Bonni elaborate, that piracy can be seen as a response to monopolist invasions and restrictions.[10] They argue that the Golden Age of Piracy can be seen as a ‘counter-culture’, an ideology that runs separate to the dominant economic structure. [11] Their argument, that counter-cultures are sustained by ideals of resistance and comprised of individuals who have ‘segregated’ themselves from a structure they previously belonged to, can be applied to the Golden Age pirates.[12] The majority of pirates were merchant men, navy sailors or former privateers: the lower orders of society. For these people, piracy offered one of the few routes for social mobility. Even the names of pirate ships give a sense of retribution; take Queen Anne’s Revenge as an example.[13] Rediker suggests that the impact of this social movement or counter culture has been largely understated: piracy, he argues, having made a significant and deliberate disruption to the capitalist trade in the 1710’s and 1720’s.[14] This period threatened a potentially revolutionary disturbance to both the economic sphere of mercantile capitalism and colonial Europe.[15] In this way, the Golden Age of Piracy might be considered as preceding the Age of Revolution, economic protests having gained a ‘popular legitimacy’.[16] The view of piracy as being a warm up to the Age of Revolution is not uncommon amongst historians. Despite this, one might criticise how far the anti-capitalist spirit of pirates can be seen as them ‘segregating’ themselves from society. Leeson describes the way in which pirates’ institutions and systems of governance were remarkably similar to those the government used to constrain their own crews.[17] Contrastingly, Rediker argues that pirates constructed their systems of authority in opposition to the world they had left behind.[18] In the context of seeing Golden Age piracy as a reactionary counter-culture to monopolist incursions, it is difficult to separate their economic motivations from the economy. The flying of the Jolly Roger Flag for example was done in both an effort to maximise profit and make recognisable their wish to avenge their masters and reject the nation state.[19] The Golden Age pirates are undeniably in this sense social bandits, making their challenge to the state as a democratic brotherhood. Nonetheless, as Leeson argues, this counter-culture is underpinned by the potential for economic gain.
Pirates’ lives prior to ‘going on the account’ are vital in understanding their position as social bandits. Hobsbawm defines social bandits as ‘peasant outlaws’ undertaking in class struggle. For the purpose of this, pirates can be described as peasants, at least in a figurative sense. Rediker describes pirates’ as ‘dispossessed proletarians’, indicating that those who engaged in piracy saw it as a chance to increase their social and monetary wealth.[20] Yet this description alone perhaps does not stress how far pirates came from the lowest social order, being desperate men who had few prospects ashore. It is this memory of the Golden Age pirate that has generated the images of pirates that live on in modern popular culture. The unnamed, limbless ‘Long John Silver’ of Robert Stevenson’s ‘Treasure Island’ might be seen as an archetypal figure of the period, having served in the Navy, lost his leg, and being left to provide for himself.[21] Piracy drew from three main groups in society: merchantmen, navy sailors and former privateers . All were characterised by various unappealing features: merchantmen were paid little, sailors in the navy were often coerced into joining up, and privateers only able to work when there was a war to engage in. Charles Johnson describes this situation in ‘A General History of the Pyrates’: ‘a considerable number of poor fellows every summer, where they engage at low wages, and are by their terms to pay for passage back to England’.[22] Johnson’s book, influential in emboldening the popular conceptions of pirates, is known to have taken considerable licenses. Despite this, the fact that Johnson interviewed John Atkins, who was sent to put down piracy on the west coast of Africa and went on to act as registrar at the trial of the infamous Bartholomew Roberts, mean we can assert his record is largely reliable.[23] The number of sailors who volunteered themselves into piracy upon capture can be seen as an explicit vindication of how appealing the life of the pirate was, or perhaps of the poor prospects for working class men onshore. In the case of Captain England in 1719, some 55 out of 143 on board a captured ship willingly volunteered to serve as pirates.[24] It was not that sailors were forced into piracy, either; one court record stating it was ‘custom amongst the pyrates to force no prisoners’.[25] All this evidence supports Rediker’s view of pirates as ‘unremarkable men caught in harsh, often deadly circumstances’. The Golden Age pirates certainly were outlaws living on the edge of society, who through plundering and robbing became to be seen by ordinary people and enduringly in popular culture as examples of popular resistance; the making of social bandits.
The apparent universality of the pirate experience plays into a larger debate about how far pirates were, as traditional historiography asserts, individualist opportunists, or part of a broader egalitarian society. In creating and operating in their own system of democracy, pirates certainly were part of a society. Both Land and Leeson describe how in separating themselves from monarch and state, pirates have no country: renouncing themselves to their own society.[26][27] The very notion of a pirate democracy itself is indicative of a pirate society that required unanimous, collective decision making.[28] Indeed, the nature of life as a pirate meant a significant onus was put on trust and teamwork: in the case of battle pirates’ lives depended on the effort of each other; death, Rediker arguing, underpinning their work.[29] The pirate articles of Bartholomew Roberts evoke a distinct language of community and belonging: ‘I. Every man has a vote in affairs of moment… and for the good of all, to vote a retrenchment’.[30] There is no doubt that the sophisticated system of democratic governance pirates created was an organised one; it being because of this, Rediker outlining, that the Golden Age pirates must be seen as a class of maritime rebels and not a ‘disorganized rabble’.[31] If we compare Rediker’s interpretation of pirates with Hobsbawm’s definition of social banditry it is clear how closely the two align. Hobsbawm stresses that social bandits are regarded by law and state as criminals, but whom remain in part within peasant society.[32] This is completely true for the Golden Age pirates, who sought to remove themselves from the framework of monarchy and state but maintained traditions of organisation and governance within their own pirate society. Captain Charles Johnson referred to pirates as an ‘abominable society’, but a society nonetheless.[33] These ‘abominable’ characteristics of piracy lend to the narrative of a projected ‘unbridled greed’.[34] Ultimately to be a pirate was a crime. Given that almost all primary material about pirates comes from court and naval records, there has certainly been a perpetuation of the violent, self-serving stereotype in traditional historiography. Perhaps the value of such sources has been overstated too, Land pointing out that in such administrative documents, the pirate is placed in a position of warning to maintain law abiding citizens.[35] Yet it is the criminal occupation of the pirate that fit Hobsbawm’s definition of social banditry. Part of their own democratic society, pirates as outlawed criminals are beacons of popular resistance, not greedy capitalists.
Perhaps the most convincing argument for pirates being social bandits is the sophisticated system of governance they established and operated under. As has been previously outlined, pirate organisation was commonly mistaken for disorder, despite being carefully conceived by pirates themselves. This view of the organisation of Golden Age pirates is incorrect. Instead, pirates can be seen as having created genuine social contracts that established a working system of constitutional democracy.[36] This form of pirate democracy extended the unrestricted rights of pirates to decision making, this most pertinently being the ability to select and dispose of their societies leaders. The principle of ‘one pirate, one vote’ meant that the choice of captain was to be made by the right of the majority. It was for this reason that on one voyage a ship went through some 13 captains.[37] Predating the Age of Revolution, one might see the Golden Age of Piracy’s democratic system of governance as preceding similar, legitimate state institutions. Bartholomew Roberts’ pirate articles are a useful primary source through which to find evidence of the democratic constitution of pirates. Individual 18thcentury pirate codes can be seen as an extension of the ‘Jamaica Discipline’, the broader framework within buccaneering that established democracy as a key form of social discipline.[38] Article I of Roberts’ code gives every pirate ‘equal vote in affairs of the moment’. Similarly, articles II and X deal with division of spoils and notably do not elevate authority figures such as captain and quartermaster significantly above the rest of the crew.[39] The profound success of Roberts’ voyages, him capturing upwards of 400 prizes in his career, should act as a resounding justification of how far pirate institutions, clearly governed by principles of democracy, really did work.[40] Through the system of piratical checks and balances, effective egalitarianism placed authority at the collective hands of the crew.[41] Despite this, to see the system of piratical checks and balances as equating to social banditry is too simplistic a narrative. Leeson’s praise of shipboard democracy relies on a criticism of the autocratic authority of merchant ships.[42] Yet this is taken entirely out of context, the nature of authority on merchant ships an institutional response to their specific economic situation, in which an absentee owner is unable to monitor sailors.[43] This argument can be applied to idea of pirate ships as a whole. Leeson claims pirate ships were organised efficiently to ensure success during battle.[44] This much is true, made up of cloth and wood, ships were volatile to any sort of severe conflict. Yet the primary concern for pirates must have been that of maximising profit. Unable to rely on the state for organisation, the purpose of a sophisticated system of governance was an economic one, not socialist. As the articles of Bartholomew Roberts confirm, there is no doubt that the Golden Age pirates established a system of constitutional democracy aboard their ships. Nonetheless, recent analyses of pirate codes have given too much weight to these socialist principles and have failed to address their principally economic foundations. In this way, there is an obvious limitation to defining the Golden Age pirates as social bandits.
Given the rise of ‘bottom-up’ history in the second half of the 20thcentury, historians have become more interested in understanding the operations and lives of pirates, rather than just the instances in which their activities intersected with the wider state and economy. Because of this, academics such as Rediker have unpicked the mask of ‘unbridled greed’ pirates have had projected upon them, stressing instead how their society was ordered by egalitarian and democratic principles.[45] The primary evidence supports this interpretation. As pirate codes show, in abandoning traditional structures of authority, pirates engaged in a shipboard democracy. The origins of most pirates and their anti-capitalist agenda too support the thesis that Golden Age pirates were social bandits. It is certainly this figure that has endured in the popular imaginary- pirate conceptions lending themselves to Hobsbawm’s definition of pirates as ‘heroes of popular resistance’.[46] Yet there are clear limitations to the application of social banditry to pirates. Ultimately the pirate revolution must be considered a failure, there was no successful overthrow of Europe. The Golden Age of Piracy is effectively the last age of the pirates before their virtual eradication by British naval forces. As Land argues, the dreams of their revolution, a key feature of Hobsbawm’s definition of social banditry, were not realised.[47] With this in mind, the popular enduring image of pirates as the forerunners of popular revolution is muddied. What’s more, though pirates did establish a system of governance that was democratic, this was underpinned by the promise of booty and the necessity for efficiency. It is easy to negate the claim ‘there is nothing of the “social bandit” about Golden Age pirates.’ Despite this, in the wake of social history too much gravity has been given to Golden Age pirates as living in a socialist utopia with a disregard for economic gain, in favour of notions of freedom and egalitarianism.
Bibliography
Primary Sources
C. Johnson, A General History of the Pirates: The Classic Account of the Most Murderous and Felonious Exploits from the Golden Age of Piracy(New York: Skyhorse Publishing, 2013)
R. L. Stevenson, Treasure Island(Boston: Roberts Brothers, 1884)
Secondary Sources
A. Blok, ‘The Peasant and the Brigand: Social Banditry Reconsidered’, Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 14, No. 4 (1972)
D. Conlin, Pirates of the Atlantic: robbery, murder and mayhem off the Canadian east coast(Nova Scotia: Formac Publishing Company Limited, 2009)
S. Dawdy and J. Bonni, ‘Towards a General Theory of Piracy’, Anthropological Quarterly, Vol. 85, No. 3, (2012)
D. Defoe, A General History of the Pyrates, (New York: Dover Publications, 1999)
E. Hobsbawm, Primitive Rebels(London: Manchester University Press, 1971)
C. Land, ‘Flying the black flag: Revolt, revolution and the social organization of piracy in the ‘golden age’’, Management and Organizational History, Vol. 2, No. 2 (2007)
P. Leeson, ‘An-aargh-chy: The Law and Economics of Pirate Organization’, Journal of Political Economy, Vo. 115, No. 6 (2007)
P. T. Leeson, ‘The Calculus of Piratical Consent: The Myth of the Myth of Social Contract’, Public Choice, Vol. 139, No. 3/4 (2009)
P. T. Leeson, The Invisible Hook: The Hidden Economics of Pirates, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press: 2009)
A. Policante, The Pirate Myth: Genealogies of an Imperial Concept(New York: Routledge, 2015)
M. Rediker, ‘”Under the Banner of King Death”: The Social World of Anglo-American Pirates, 1716-1726’ William and Mary Quarterly, Vol. 38, No. 2 (1981)
M. Rediker, Villains of All Nations: Atlantic Pirates in the Golden Age, (Boston: Beacon Press, 2004)
Endnotes
[1]M. Rediker, ‘”Under the Banner of King Death”: The Social World of Anglo-American Pirates, 1716-1726’ William and Mary Quarterly, Vol. 38, No. 2 (1981) p.203.
[2]A. Policante, The Pirate Myth: Genealogies of an Imperial Concept(New York: Routledge, 2015) p.19.
[3]Rediker, ‘Under the Banner’ p.204
[4]E. Hobsbawm, Primitive Rebels(London: Manchester University Press, 1971) pp.13-24.
[5]P. Leeson, ‘An-aargh-chy: The Law and Economics of Pirate Organization’, Journal of Political Economy, Vo. 115, No. 6 (2007) p.27.
[6]Leeson, ‘An-aargh-chy’p.4.
[7]M. Rediker, Villains of All Nations: Atlantic Pirates in the Golden Age, (Boston: Beacon Press, 2004) p.210.
[8]C. Johnson, A General History of the Pirates: The Classic Account of the Most Murderous and Felonious Exploits from the Golden Age of Piracy(New York: Skyhorse Publishing, 2013) p.20.
[9]A. Blok, ‘The Peasant and the Brigand: Social Banditry Reconsidered’, Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 14, No. 4 (1972) p.3.
[10]S. Dawdy and J. Bonni, ‘Towards a General Theory of Piracy’, Anthropological Quarterly, Vol. 85, No. 3, (2012) p.676.
[11]Dawdy, Bonni, ‘Piracy’ p.677.
[12]Dawdy, Bonni, ‘Piracy’ p.677.
[13]Rediker, ‘Anglo-American Pirates’ p.215.
[14]Rediker, Pirates in the Golden Age, p.70.
[15]C. Land, ‘Flying the black flag: Revolt, revolution and the social organization of piracy in the ‘golden age’’, Management and Organizational History, Vol. 2, No. 2 (2007) p.170.
[16]Dawdy, Bonni, ‘Piracy’ p.677.
[17]Leeson, ‘Pirate Organization’ p.1.
[18]Rediker, ‘Anglo-American Pirates’ p.214.
[19]Land, ‘Piracy in the golden age’ p.177.
[20]Rediker, Pirates in the Golden Age, p.56.
[21]R. L. Stevenson, Treasure Island(Boston: Roberts Brothers, 1884) p.4.
[22]Johnson, A General History, p.218.
[23]D. Defoe, A General History of the Pyrates, (New York: Dover Publications, 1999) p.31.
[24]Rediker, Pirates in the Golden Age, p.142.
[25]Rediker, ‘Anglo-American Pirates’ p.215.
[26]Land, ‘Piracy in the golden age’ p.179.
[27]P. T. Leeson, The Invisible Hook: The Hidden Economics of Pirates, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press: 2009) p.21.
[28]Leeson, Economics of Pirates, p.26.
[29]Land, ‘Piracy in the golden age’ p.177.
[30]Johnson, A General History, pp.230-232.
[31]Rediker, Pirates in the Golden Age, p.65.
[32]Hobsbawm, Primitive Rebels, p.54.
[33]Johnson, A General History, p.72.
[34]Dawdy, Bonni, ‘Piracy’ p.695.
[35]Land, ‘Piracy in the golden age’ p.180.
[36]P. T. Leeson, ‘The Calculus of Piratical Consent: The Myth of the Myth of Social Contract’, Public Choice, Vol. 139, No. 3/4 (2009) p.443.
[37]Leeson, Economics of Pirates, p.30.
[38]Leeson, ‘Myth of Social Contract’, p.450.
[39]Johnson, A General History, pp.230-232.
[40]D. Conlin, Pirates of the Atlantic: robbery, murder and mayhem off the Canadian east coast(Nova Scotia: Formac Publishing Company Limited, 2009) p.32.
[41]Rediker, ‘Anglo-American Pirates’ p.209.
[42]Leeson, ‘Pirate Organization’ p.13.
[43]Leeson, ‘Pirate Organization’ p.14.
[44]Leeson, ‘Myth of Social Contract’ p.447.
[45]Dawdy, Bonni, ‘Piracy’ p.695.
[46]Hobsbawm, Primitive Rebels, p.10.
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