How Important was the 1954 Brown vs Board of Education Verdict to Ending Legal Segregation in America?

By Ryan Barrett, Third Year History

This is an extended 3,500 word research essay from the third year unit Black Lives Matter: The African American Freedom Struggle (1945-Present), receiving a mark of 70. The Brown vs Board of Education verdict acted as a catalyst for the end of legal segregation and provided a precedent for further litigation against segregation, ensuring its place as a canonised moment in the Civil Rights Movement. This essay succinctly explores the case and its ramifications, providing a useful reference point for those interested in the liberation of African Americans.

On May 17th, 1954, the Supreme Court ruled that segregation in schools was unconstitutional. The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, Earl Warren, argued that segregated schools were inherently unequal, in spite of equalization of facilities, as they denoted feelings of inferiority amongst African American students.[1] The implications of this decision were boundless, as it overturned Plessy vs Ferguson, the Supreme Court decision that segregation was legal, as long as facilities were equal.[2] The Brown decision thus challenged, in theory, the system of legal segregation in the American South. However, Brown did not lead to the immediate desegregation of schools. There was a backlash to the decision, with racist politicians avoiding implementing the decision and racist Southerners forming organizations like the White Citizens’ Councils, to attempt to uphold Southern segregation. Yet, by the late 1960s, the federal government had passed laws ending legal segregation in America. This essay will question how impactful the Brown decision was to ending legal segregation. It will argue that, despite not leading directly to school desegregation, it was a catalyst for segregation to be undermined and links to the Civil Rights legislation passed in the 1960s.

A newspaper clipping, published in response to the verdict (17 May 1954)

Scholars tend to agree that the Brown decision did not lead to desegregation in the Southern schooling system in the decade following the ruling. The major point of disagreement concerns whether Brown was an inspiration to the Civil Rights Movement. As the Civil Rights Movement led to the passage of the Civil Rights legislation, historians who see Brown as an inspiration draw a link between Brown and these acts. This is the majority opinion, being held by Clayborne Carson; David Garrow; Constance Motley; Waldo Martin; James Patterson; Brian Daugherity and Charles Bolton.[3] While many of these scholars emphasize the various long-term factors that lay behind the emergence of the Civil Rights Movement, they all retain Brown’s importance as a catalyst. Alternatively, there is a revisionist literature that denies Brown’s direct importance to the Civil Rights Movement. Two scholars who hold this view are Michael Klarman and Gerald Rosenberg, who both believe that the Civil Rights Movement would have emerged regardless of the Brown case, thus the case was not necessary for ending legal segregation.[4] Klarman, however, simultaneously canonizes Brown, arguing that indirectly, Brown did help lead to the legislation of the 1960s. Klarman’s views will be examined in depth throughout this essay, as he simultaneously presents a convincing argument for why Brown was important, whilst dismissing vital evidence in a pursuit to undermine the traditional account.

In the short term, Brown did not lead to school desegregation. While some counties, for example Fayetteville and Charleston in Arkansas, desegregated in response to Brown, most school boards pursued a strategy of delaying desegregation indefinitely.[5] The Supreme Court’s ruling for implementation of the Brown decision, Brown II, assisted those who wished to delay implementation indefinitely. In Brown II, Justice Warren ruled that desegregation should be carried out ‘with all deliberate speed’, yet that local conditions should be considered when implementing the decision.[6] Warren delegated implementation of Brown to local courts and argued that states should ‘make a prompt and reasonable start toward full compliance.’[7] Delegating implementation of Brown to the states that practiced de-jure segregation allowed for these states to delay implementation, which they had no intention of complying with. Therefore, most school boards did not implement school desegregation until 1964, when the Civil Rights Act allowed for ‘federal officials to cut off aid from school districts that practiced de-jure segregation.’[8] Some states delayed implementation even further. For example, Mississippi implemented freedom of choice plans that were structured to ensure that as few African American children attended integrated schools.[9] Mississippi thus saw limited desegregation until the Supreme Court ruled that these freedom of choice plans were unconstitutional in 1969.[10] Furthermore, whilst legal school segregation had ended by the 1970s, the difficulties of implementing desegregation and the prevalence of white students entering private schools mean that schools are still some of the most de-facto segregated institutions in America today. As of 2000, only 28.4% of African American children attended majority white schools and 37.4% attended schools that were had 90% or more of students being from an ethnic minority.[11]The fact that schools have never been fully desegregated has led Clayborne Carson to suggest that Brown should have both attacked segregation and unequal facilities, as this may have led to inequalities reducing quicker.[12] Despite these reservations, the Civil Rights legislation in the 1960s and subsequent litigation was successful in bringing an end to de-jure segregation in public Southern facilities.[13] Thus, if a direct link can be drawn between Brown and these acts and litigation, then Brown can be viewed as a catalyst for the elimination of legal segregation.

The backlash to the Brown case is one of the most important links in the chain that leads from Brown to the Civil Rights legislation of the 1960s. Michael Klarman notably argued for what he referred to as ‘the backlash thesis.’[14] This thesis states that following Brown, there was a revolt against the decision in the South.[15]This revolt led to race replacing class as the key issue in Southern politics, which led to many populist politicians who were moderates on racial issues being replaced with die-hard segregationists.[16] These die-hard segregationists reacted to the Civil Rights Movement’s protests with state organized violence. Civil Rights leaders anticipated that they would react with this violence, thus encouraged protestors to react with non-violence.[17] The violence demonstrated by these racist officials towards peaceful protestors outraged Northern liberals and pushed for the federal government to act.[18] For example, the Civil Rights Movement protested in Birmingham anticipating a violent reaction from Commissioner Bull Connor, a notoriously racist official. They sent out young students as protestors, who were attacked by the police with fire hoses and attack dogs. Images of these events prompted widespread outrage and led to the Kennedy administration introducing the Civil Rights Act of 1964.[19] This thesis shows how Brown can be indirectly linked to the 1964 Civil Rights Act.

However, the backlash thesis has not received unanimous approval. Gerald Rosenberg opposes the idea that court decisions lead to widespread social change. He argued that Brown did not lead to the backlash, but that the Civil Rights Movement alone did.[20] He additionally argued that regardless of whether die-hard segregationists were elected in the South or not, the Civil Rights Movement would have been confronted with violence, which would have provoked the government action seen in the 1960s.[21] On the latter point, violence would have occurred towards the Civil Rights Protestors regardless of the election of die-hard segregationists. However, the fact that the violence that did occur was clearly authorized by elected Southern officials strengthened the hand of the Civil Rights Movement. This was because the violence being state authorized directly linked this violence to the system of legal segregation, thus directly demonstrating that the system itself was violent and necessary to abolish. If die-hard segregationists had not been elected, it is likely that moderate segregationists would have been able to disconnect violence from the system of segregation and retain the system for longer. The Albany campaign demonstrates this, as officials avoided using violence and were successfully able to prevent desegregation in the city.[22] Rosenberg’s argument that Brown did not lead to the backlash is enhanced by Klarman’s argument linking the election of the die-hard segregationists to Brown being weak. Klarman looks at election results before and after Brown, showing that more die-hard segregationists were elected after Brown, yet does not show a direct link between these elections and Brown.[23] As the Civil Rights Movement emerged shortly after Brown, it is unclear from Klarman’s argument which factor led to the backlash. However, it can be shown that a large proportion of Southern resistance was directly linked to Brown. 

Following the Brown decision, white Southern newspapers condemned it. The Jackson Mississippi Daily News published a racist article, comparing Brown to ‘Bloodstains On White Marble Steps’ and the University of Virginia Cavalier Daily said that the decision was ‘contrary to a way of life’ in the South.[24] Additionally, in 1956, most Southern federal politicians signed the Southern Manifesto. This manifesto argued that the Brown decision was encroaching on the rights of the South and called for Southern states to ‘resist forced integration by any lawful means.’[25] As this manifesto was published whilst the Montgomery Bus Boycott was gaining national attention, it is notable that it emphasizes Brown as the threat to segregation that should be resisted, not the emerging Civil Rights Movement. The fate of several Southern politicians who refused to sign the manifesto links the election of die-hard segregationists directly to Brown. In North Carolina, Richard Chatham and Charles Deane refused to sign the manifesto and were defeated in subsequent primary elections.[26]Harold Cooley, who also refused to sign, survived a primary attempt, but only as he adapted a strategy of appearing more racist than his opponent and ‘proclaiming that he hated and despised the Brown decision.’[27]These elections show how important opposing Brown was to Southern politics, backing up Klarman’s thesis. Furthermore, the White Citizens’ Councils, organizations formed to resist efforts to desegregate the South, were formed in the wake of Brown, before the major phase of the Civil Rights Movement. Therefore, this evidence shows that Brown was a vital factor in motivating Southern resistance to desegregation. Combined with Klarman’s backlash thesis, this evidence shows that Brown was a catalyst towards ending legal segregation in America.

While Klarman’s backlash thesis is compelling, his rejection of the traditional narrative of Brown’s impact leaves a lot to be desired. The traditional narrative is that Brown, through overturning Plessey and declaring that the Supreme Court was on the side of desegregation, inspired many African Americans. Many of the African Americans who were inspired by the Brown decision would subsequently join the emerging Civil Rights Movement. This caused the Civil Rights Movement to grow, and this movement eventually led to the end of legal segregation in America. Thus, Brown can be directly linked to the end of legal segregation. Klarman argues that this narrative is incorrect and that Brown was not a major inspiration to the Civil Rights Movement.[28] His primary pieces of evidence are a New York Times article that showed Civil Rights did not poll as one of America’s most important issues following Brown and that Martin Luther King’s rally on the anniversary of Brown had a low turnout.[29]  While Klarman acknowledges individual cases where Brown was an inspiration, he contends that several long-term factors were more important to the Civil Rights Movement’s growth.[30]One factor Klarman emphasizes was the Double Victory campaign, a campaign by black soldiers during WW2 to win democracy at home as well as abroad, alongside other factors such as the emergence of a black middle class and the increased urbanization of the South.[31] While these long-term factors were important, Klarman’s conclusion that these factors invalidate Brown negates the many pieces of evidence that show that the Brown decision was a widespread inspiration. 

David Garrow has argued that the Brown decision was a widespread inspiration, yet the quotes he uses as evidence largely come from major figures of the Civil Rights Movement, like King and Rosa Parks.[32] Quotes from major figures emphasizing Brown do exist, for example Martin Luther King emphasized that ‘On May seventeenth, 1954, the Supreme Court of this nation rendered in simple and unequivocal terms one of the most momentous decisions ever rendered in the history of this nation… It came as a great beacon light of hope to millions.’[33] Yet, there is also evidence from other sources, that show just how widespread inspiration following the Brown decision was, for example the reaction from African American newspapers. The Chicago Defender stated that the decision meant ‘the beginning of the end of the dual society in American life.’[34] The Richmond Afro-American produced a cartoon that showed how important they viewed the decision. In this cartoon, the Supreme Court’s decision is represented by a nuclear explosion, with the words ‘Decision on Segregated Schools’ being written in the middle of the explosion.[35] The fact that, in the context of the Cold War and mutually assured destruction, the cartoonist of the Richmond Afro-American viewed the Supreme Court’s decision as being as important of an event as a nuclear explosion shows that the decision was seen by contemporaries as being momentous and impactful. Furthermore, in his book, James Patterson showed that many individual African Americans were directly inspired and moved by the Brown decision. Patterson quoted Sara Lightford, a 10-year-old African American girl, who recalled that ‘jubilation, optimism and hope filled my home… for the first time in my life I saw tears in my father’s eyes’ following the Brown decision.[36] He also quoted the black history professor Robert Jackson, who stated ‘I haven’t seen such collective emotion since the day Roosevelt died… today the students reacted as if a heavy burden had been lifted from their shoulders.’[37] From these quotes, it becomes apparent that many individual African Americans felt that their rights had been won by the Brown decision. While the Brown decision did not lead to immediate desegregation, the reactions from all these individuals shows that people saw that the Brown decision as an opportunity for legal segregation to be undermined. Many of these individuals, after the disappointment of the years following Brown would have been inspired to join the growing Civil Rights Movement. The many testaments, from King, to African American newspapers, to the individuals who wept on the day Brown was announced, attest to inspiration being widespread. Thus, Brown be placed as a direct catalyst towards the growth of the Civil Rights Movement, thus can be directly linked to the legislation that ended legal segregation in America.

In addition to being a catalyst for the eventual passage of the Civil Rights Act 1964, Brown set a precedent for further litigation against legal segregation. For example, shortly after Brown, the Supreme Court used the ruling as a precedent to rule that segregated golf courses, public beaches and bathhouses were unconstitutional.[38] The NAACP recognized the potential of Brown to lead directly to desegregation, so began litigation campaigns to desegregate individual school districts.[39] Whilst this strategy took the form of gradualism and was often unsuccessful when faced with Southern resistance, there were occasions where the precedent of Brown caused individual districts to desegregate. For example, in 1955 the NAACP successfully sued the Van Buren school district in Arkansas and forced the district to implement a desegregation plan.[40]Furthermore, litigation bought desegregation to the school district of Dollarway, which was ordered by federal courts to admit black students.[41] Whilst this litigation was incomplete, affected a marginal amount of districts and took far too long to implement, its existence shows that the potential for Brown to be implemented through the courts existed. However, one of the most notable pieces of litigation linked directly to Brown is not related to school segregation, but to bus segregation. The Montgomery Bus Boycott is best remembered as the protest that thrust Martin Luther King into national attention, desegregated the Montgomery bus system and led to the formation of the SCLC. What is less well known is that, without litigation, the boycott would have been unsuccessful. Both the protest leaders and the city of Montgomery knew how important litigation was to the success of the boycott. The city of Montgomery consistently filed lawsuits to curtail the boycott, including the city declaring that the carpool system was illegal. The carpool system was used by boycotters as an alternative transport system to the buses, so the loss of this system could make the continuation of the boycott untenable.[42] Whilst this was happening, the NAACP had filed the case Browder v. Gale, arguing that segregated buses were unconstitutional. When bought to the Supreme Court, they affirmed that segregation in buses was unconstitutional, citing the Brown case as a precedent.[43] This ruling led to the desegregation of the Montgomery bus system, a landmark achievement for the emerging Civil Rights Movement. Thus, not only was Brown an inspiration for the Civil Rights Movement, but it also had a direct impact in the growth of the movement, through being used as precedent for one of the movement’s initial victories.[44]

In conclusion, this essay showed how the Brown decision was important to ending legal segregation in America. While it did not lead to swift desegregation of schools, the threat to segregation led to a backlash in the South. This violent backlash was capitalized on by the Civil Rights Movement, who pushed the federal government into formulating legislation that ended legal segregation. Additionally, the Brown case acted as an inspiration to the emerging Civil Rights Movement. While the long-term factors identified by many historians had to exist for the movement to emerge, the Brown case was seen by many African Americans as signaling the end of segregation. Many of these same African Americans were persuaded to become active in the Civil Rights Movement, which ended legal segregation in America. Brown was additionally used as a precedent to litigate against other forms of legal segregation, most notably in the case of the Montgomery Bus Boycott, one of the most important turning points in the Civil Rights Movement. For these reasons, Brown deserves to keep its place as a canonized moment in the Civil Rights Movement, as a catalyst for the events that ended legal segregation in America.

Bibliography

Secondary Sources

Badger, Tony, ‘Southerners who Refused to Sign the Southern Manifesto’, The Historical Journal, 42 (1999), pp.517-534.

Bolton, Charles, ‘The Last Holdout: Mississippi and the Brown Decision’ in With All Deliberate Speed: Implementing Brown v. Board of Education, ed. by Daugherity, Brian and Bolton, Charles (Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 2008), pp.123-138.

Brown, K.D., ‘Brown v. Board of Education: Reexamination of the Desegregation of Public Education from the Perspective of the Post Desegregation Era’, University of Toledo Law Review, pp.773-812.

Carson, Clayborne, ‘Two Cheers for Brown v. Board of Education’, The Journal of American History, 91 (2004), pp.26-31.

Daugherity, Brian and Bolton, Charles, ‘Introduction’ in With All Deliberate Speed: Implementing Brown v. Board of Education, ed. by Daugherity, Brian and Bolton, Charles (Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 2008), pp.vii-xvi.

Garrow, David, ‘Hopelessly Hollow History: Revisionist Devaluing of Brown v. Board of Education’, 80 (1994), pp.151-160.

Glennon, Robert, ‘The Role of Law in the Civil Rights Movement: The Montgomery Bus Boycott’, Law and History Review, 9 (1991), pp.59-112.

Klarman, Michael, ‘Brown, Racial Change, and the Civil Rights Movement’, Virginia Law Review, 80 (1994), pp.7-150.

Klarman, Michael, ‘How Brown Changed Racial Relations: The Backlash Thesis’, The Journal of American History, 81 (1994), pp.81-118.

Lewis, Johanna Miller, ‘Implementing Brown in Arkansas’ in With All Deliberate Speed: Implementing Brown v. Board of Education, ed. by Daugherity, Brian and Bolton, Charles (Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 2008), pp.1-20.

Martin, Waldo, Brown v. Board of Education: A Brief History with Documents, (Boston: Bedford/St. Martins, 1998).

Motley, Constance, ‘The Historical Setting of Brown and its Impact on the Supreme Court’s Decision’, Fordham Law Review, 61 (1992), pp.9-17.

Patterson, James, Brown v. Board of Education: A Civil Rights Milestone and its Troubled Legacy, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006).

Rosenberg, Gerald, ‘Brown is Dead! Long Live Brown! The Endless Attempts to Canonize a Case’, Virginia Law Review, 80 (1994), pp.161-171.

Tushnet, Mark, ‘The Significance of Brown v. Board of Education’, Virginia Law Review, 80 (1994), pp.173-184.

Primary Sources

Brown, Justice Henry, Majority Opinion in Plessy v. Ferguson (1896) in Martin, Waldo, Brown v. Board of Education: A Brief History with Documents (Boston: Bedford/St. Martins, 1998), pp.76-80.

Chicago Defender, End of Dual Society (May 18, 1954) in Martin, Waldo, Brown v. Board of Education: A Brief History with Documents (Boston: Bedford/St. Martins, 1998), p.203.

Jackson Mississippi Daily News, Bloodstains On White Marble Steps (May 18, 1954) in Martin, Waldo, Brown v. Board of Education: A Brief History with Documents (Boston: Bedford/St. Martins, 1998), p.204.

King Jr., Martin Luther, Letter From a Birmingham Jail (12 June 1963) https://www.africa.upenn.edu/Articles_Gen/Letter_Birmingham.html [Accessed 7 November 2021].

King Jr., Martin Luther, “Desegregation and the Future” (December 15, 1956) https://kinginstitute.stanford.edu/king-papers/documents/desegregation-and-future-address-delivered-annual-luncheon-national-committee [Accessed 7 November 2021].

Public Law 88-352 (July 2nd, 1964), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-78/pdf/STATUTE-78-Pg241.pdf [Accessed 6 November 2021].

Richmond Afro-American, A Supreme Court Bomb (May 22, 1954) in Martin, Waldo, Brown v. Board of Education: A Brief History with Documents (Boston: Bedford/St. Martins, 1998), p.217.

The Southern Manifesto (March 12, 1956) in Martin, Waldo, Brown v. Board of Education: A Brief History with Documents (Boston: Bedford/St. Martins, 1998), pp.220-223.

University of Virginia Cavalier Daily, “Violates” Way of Life (May 18, 1954) in Martin, Waldo, Brown v. Board of Education: A Brief History with Documents (Boston: Bedford/St. Martins, 1998), pp.206-207.

Warren, Chief Justice Earl, Opinion of the Court in Brown v. Board of Education (May 17, 1954) in Martin, Waldo, Brown v. Board of Education: A Brief History with Documents (Boston: Bedford/St. Martins, 1998), pp.168-174.

Warren, Chief Justice Earl, Ruling on Relief (May 31, 1955) in Martin, Waldo, Brown v. Board of Education: A Brief History with Documents (Boston: Bedford/St. Martins, 1998), pp.194-198.

Footnotes

[1] Chief Justice Earl Warren, Opinion of the Court in Brown v. Board of Education (May 17, 1954) in Waldo Martin, Brown v. Board of Education: A Brief History with Documents (Boston: Bedford/St. Martins, 1998), pp.173-174.

[2] Justice Henry Brown, Majority Opinion in Plessy v. Ferguson (1896) in Martin, pp.78-80.

[3] Clayborne Carson, ‘Two Cheers for Brown v. Board of Education’, The Journal of American History, 91 (2004), 27; David Garrow, ‘Hopelessly Hollow History: Revisionist Devaluing of Brown v. Board of Education’, Virginia Law Review, 80 (1994), 151-153; Constance Motley, ‘The Historical Setting of Brown and its Impact on the Supreme Court’s Decision’, Fordham Law Review, 61 (1992), 16; James Patterson, Brown v. Board of Education: A Civil Rights Milestone and Its Troubled Legacy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp.xiv-xvii; With All Deliberate Speed: Implementing Brown v. Board of Education, ed. by Brian Daugherity and Charles Bolton (Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 2008), p.vii; Martin, p.37.

[4] Michael Klarman, ‘How Brown Changed Race Relations: The Backlash Thesis’, The Journal of American History, 81 (1994), 86-88; Klarman, ‘Brown, Racial Change, and the Civil Rights Movement’, Virginia Law Review, 80 (1994), 77-84; Gerald Rosenberg, ‘Brown is Dead! Long Live Brown! The Endless Attempts to Canonize a Case’, Virginia Law Review, 80 (1994), 163-165.

[5] Johanna Miller Lewis, ‘Implementing Brown in Arkansas’ in With All Deliberate Speed, pp.5-6.

[6] Chief Justice Earl Warren, Ruling on Relief (May 31, 1955) in Martin, p.198.

[7] Ruling on Relief in Martin, p.195-197.

[8] Patterson, p.137; Public Law 88-352 (July 2nd, 1964), pp.252-253 https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-78/pdf/STATUTE-78-Pg241.pdf [Accessed 6 November 2021].

[9] Charles Bolton, ‘The Last Holdout: Mississippi and the Brown Decision’ in With All Deliberate Speed, pp.132-134.

[10] Bolton, pp.135-136.

[11] K.D. Brown, ‘Brown v. Board of Education: Reexamination of the Desegregation of Public Education from the Perspective of the Post-Desegregation Era’, University of Toledo Law Review, 35 (2004), 773-774.

[12] Carson, 30.

[13] Public Law 88-352, p.246 https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-78/pdf/STATUTE-78-Pg241.pdf [Accessed 6 November 2021]. 

[14] Klarman, ‘The Backlash Thesis’, p.81-82.

[15] Klarman, ‘Brown, Racial Change, and the Civil Rights Movement’, 10-11.

[16] Klarman, ‘Brown, Racial Change, and the Civil Rights Movement’, 101.

[17] Martin Luther King Jr., Letter From a Birmingham Jail (12 June 1963) https://www.africa.upenn.edu/Articles_Gen/Letter_Birmingham.html [Accessed 7 November 2021].

[18] Klarman, ‘Brown, Racial Change, and the Civil Rights Movement’, 141-149.

[19] Klarman, ‘Brown, Racial Change, and the Civil Rights Movement’, 144-146.

[20] Rosenberg, 165.

[21] Rosenberg, 169.

[22] Klarman, ‘Brown, Racial Change, and the Civil Rights Movement’, 143.

[23] Klarman, ‘Brown, Racial Change, and the Civil Rights Movement’, 85-118.

[24] Jackson Mississippi Daily News, Bloodstains On White Marble Steps (May 18, 1954) in Martin, p.204; University of Virginia Cavalier Daily, “Violates” Way of Life (May 18, 1954) in Martin, pp.206-207.

[25] The Southern Manifesto (March 12, 1956) in Martin, pp.220-223.

[26] Tony Badger, ‘Southerners who Refused to Sign the Southern Manifesto’, The Historical Journal, 42 (1999), 528-531.

[27] Badger, 532.

[28] Klarman, ‘Brown, Racial Change, and the Civil Rights Movement’, 11.

[29] Klarman, ‘The Backlash Thesis’, 86, 89-90.

[30] Klarman, ‘Brown, Racial Change, and the Civil Rights Movement’, 79-82.

[31] Klarman, ‘Brown, Racial Change, and the Civil Rights Movement’, 14-18, 20-21, 52-65; Martin, p.6.

[32] Garrow, 155-157.

[33] Martin Luther King Jr., “Desegregation and the Future” (December 15, 1956) https://kinginstitute.stanford.edu/king-papers/documents/desegregation-and-future-address-delivered-annual-luncheon-national-committee [Accessed 7 November 2021].

[34] Chicago Defender, End of Dual Society (May 18, 1954) in Martin, p.203.

[35] Richmond Afro-American, A Supreme Court Bomb (May 22, 1954) in Martin, p.217.

[36] Patterson, p.70.

[37] Patterson, p.70.

[38] Robert Glennon, ‘The Role of Law in the Civil Rights Movement: The Montgomery Bus Boycott, 1955-1957’, Law and History Review, 59 (1991), 91-92.

[39] With All Deliberate Speed, pp.ix-x.

[40] Lewis, pp.9-10, Martin, p.12.

[41] Lewis, pp.15-16.

[42] Glennon, p.84.

[43] Glennon, p.84; Motley, p.15.

[44] Mark Tushnet, ‘The Significance of Brown v. Board of Education’, Virginia Law Review, 80 (1994), 179.